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Valentine Act
the above statutes constitutes an unfair trade practice. The only plausible
explanation is that attorneys in Ohio are not cognizant of this possible
cause of action. If attorneys throughout the state can be inculcated to
its potentialities, this section should take its rightful place as a major
weapon against unfair competition. The illegitimate businessman will
be less anxious to embark on a policy of unfair trade practice if he knows
that this section probably will be used against him. Of course, active
enforcement also would reduce substantially the evils resulting when
businessmen violate penal statutes to gain a competitive advantage. It
is submitted that both the use of section 1.16 and active enforcement
procedures are reasonable and necessary weapons which should and must
be used if unfair trade practices are to be eliminated.
NEIL B. KuRIT
The Valentine Act
A search of Ohio's legal arsenal for weapons to combat unfair trade
practices would be incomplete if it failed to discover the Valentine Act,'
Ohio's antitrust statute. One of a number of state-enacted contempo-
raries of the Sherman Act,2 the Valentine Act was designed to blanket
the area of intrastate commercial activity not reached by federal legisla-
tion. In 1898, this area appeared to be of greater scope and thus of
more import than at present. Yet even in the period immediately fol-
lowing its enactment the Valentine Act seldom was applied.
Recently, the Valentine Act has been ignored almost completely.'
Attempting to disclose whether the act has present value, the author will
review its provisions and the record of its interpretation and enforcementL
This completed, the future of the act will be considered.
JURISDICTION OF THE VALENTINE ACT
Congress accorded the Sherman Act a scope as broad as its constitu-
tionally derived powers permitted.4 For the statute was made applicable
to conspiracies in restraint of "trade or commerce among the several
1. OHio REv. CODE §5 1331.01-.99. This body of statutes, on occasion, also is referred t>
as the "Monopolies" law, its present statutory title. It was originally enacted as the Valentine
Antitrust Law of April 19, 1898.
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
3. An inquiry addressed to the office of the Attorney General of Ohio in 1956 by a special
committee of the New York State Bar Association elicited the response that the office had
handled no cases under the Valentine Act in the preceding eighteen years. It also indicated
that there had been no cases during that time in either the Ohio Supreme Court or the Ohit>
Courts of Appeals. N.Y.S.B.A., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMN=rEE To STUDY THE NEtv
YORK ANTITRUST LAWS 107a (1957).
4. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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States... ."' At a time when the power to regulate interstate commerce
was not thought so extensive as now, there appeared need for state anti-
trust regulations to complement those of the national government.' Pres-
ently, however, the federal power is exercised in almost every sphere of
commercial activity. This development would seem to suggest that
state antitrust laws have no value.
Yet the conclusion would be unwarranted, as federal activity in the
antitrust field does not preclude state activity. Perhaps states may not
deal directly with combinations which monopolize and restrain interstate
or foreign trade and commerce exclusively.' Since the Sherman Act is
not exclusive, however, state legislatures have the power to enact statutes
intended to protect state trade and commerce, 8 and, therefore, have the
right to enact antitrust statutes to operate within their own jurisdictions.9
The extent to which a state may exercise control over combinations
which have some tie with interstate commerce is not completely dear."
Apparently, a state antitrust statute is not invalid because it affects inter-
state commerce incidentally." Thus, it seems that federal and state anti-
trust laws have concurrent jurisdiction; and, in some instances, a single
contract in restraint of trade may be offensive to both and therefore sub-
ject to dual restraint.'2 For example, the subject-matter of a transaction
either has been imported from outside the state 3 or is initially intrastate
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
6. Populist agitation for antitrust measures provided some of the drive behind the movement
to enact state antitrust statutes. Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J. 160 (1961).
The movement was stimulated by the Supreme Court's holding that manufacture was not com-
merce. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
7. See Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed. 242 (8th Cit. 1906).
8. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,
212 U.S. 86 (1909); Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N.E. 42 (1916).
9. Wagner v. Minnie Harvester Co., 25 Okla. 558, 106 Pac. 969 (1910).
10. This subject cannot be given the extended treatment it deserves in this article. See gen-
erally N.Y.S.B.A., op. cit. supra. note 3, at 53a; Annot., 24 A.L.. 787 (1923). Perhaps sig-
nificant contacts with the combination will justify state control.
11. See Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910), affirming 120 Tenn. 86,
110 S.W. 565 (1907); Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 78 N.E. 136 (1906),
writ of error dismissed mem., 207 U.S. 599 (1907); Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359
Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W.
705 (1907).
12. Standard Oil Co. v. State, 107 Miss. 377, 65 So. 468 (1914); State v. Southeast Tex.
Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractor's Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), cert. de-
zied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963). Cf. State ex rel. Hogan v. Hocking Valley Ry., 8 Ohio App.
450 (1917). In this case, stocks in coal companies and a competing railroad had been dis-
posed of by defendants under an order by a United States District Court because they had
been held in restraint of interstate competition. The state, however, was entitled to have the
dissolution made permanent as to intrastate traffic and to have supervision over the future
conduct of defendants in respect thereto.
13. See Standard Oil Co. v. State, 107 Miss. 377, 65 So. 468 (1914). Contracts to pur-
chase goods from outside the state for resale at stipulated prices within the state, whereby the
purchaser agreed to buy goods only from that particular seller, have been held subject to state
antitrust laws, as have contracts which restrict the seller. Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co., 90 Tex.
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in character and later enters the stream of interstate commerce. 4 Such
an occurrence does not necessarily remove the transaction from the reach
of the state antitrust law. As the volume of intrastate commercial ac-
tivity is not inconsiderable, a significant area is subject to the mandates
of the state.
Still, the range of the Valentine Act is restrained by traditional no-
tions of jurisdiction, as well as by the Constitution. It obviously can have
no extraterritorial operation.' " However, as the Valentine Act individual-
ly proscribes acts and contracts in restraint of trade, it has been held ap-
plicable not only to contracts and acts restraining trade within the state,
but also to contracts which, although formulated outside the state, have
an effect within it.'" Furthermore, it has been applied to contracts hav-
ing their monopolistic effect outside the state although made in Ohio"
The act's generalized terms might seem to give it an even broader area of
applicability, but this is the realistic limit of its influence.
There is some similarity between the jurisdictional provisions of the
federal antitrust statutes and those of the Valentine Act. The courts are
not bound in either case by unusual territorial limitations. Under the
Ohio Act, a summons may issue in any county,"8 while the federal sum-
mons may issue in any district.'" But the Sherman Act is national in
scope with attending greater power to bring before the court all parties
to a widespread conspiracy, while the Valentine Act applies only in Ohio.
CONTENT OF THE VALENTINE ACT
Prohibitions
Could the Valentine Act be distilled to an essence, it would be a state-
ment that combinations and acts in restraint of trade are illegal, and com-
pacts designed to further their illegal ends are void. The provisions of
the Valentine Act are quite detailed, however, unlike the simple state-
ment of the Sherman Act.2" In the Ohio act, a trust is said to be unlaw-
298, 38 S.W. 29 (1896); Pictorial Review Co. v. Pate Bros., 185 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916).
14. See Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. State, 257 U.S. 129 (1921), affirming 121 Miss. 615,
83 So. 680 (1920).
15. Chicago Wall Paper Mills v. General Paper Co., 147 Fed. 491 (7th Cit. 1906); State v.
Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 66 Ark. 466, 51 S.W. 633 (1899).
16. State v. Ice Delivery Co., 5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 89 (C.P. 1907).
17. Ibid.
18. OHIo REv. CODE § 1331.12.
19. 26 Star. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1958). This provision applies, however, only to
criminal prosecutions.
20. Later exceptions and provisos excluded, the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is [hereby] declared to be illegal... '-
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). In Clover Meadow Creamery v.
National Dairy Prods. Co., 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 243 (C.P. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 17
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ful and void. 1 But in this instance the legislature meant more by "trust"
than its ordinary meaning. It is defined in the Valentine Act as a combi-
nation of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of a num-
ber of unlawful purposes.22 Among those purposes are: (1) to effect
restrictions in trade or commerce;23 (2) to reduce the production, or alter
the price of merchandise or a commodity;2" (3) to prevent competition
in the manufacture, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise or a
commodity; 25 (4) to fix or control the price of merchandise or a com-
modity intended for public sale, use, or consumption;26 (5) to contract
or agree not to sell or transport an article or commodity for a price below
a fixed value, or to maintain the price at a fixed or graduated figure so
as to preclude free competition, or to pool interests connected with the
sale or transport in order to affect its price.27 Such combinations are de-
dared unlawful conspiracies against trade, 8 and, in a different section of
the act, contracts designed to bring about or further them are termed
"void. ,29
While they are more explicit, the substance of these Valentine Act
provisions is comparable to that of the federal antitrust law." Although
"monopoly," specifically treated by the Sherman Act,3 is mentioned by
name but once in the Ohio act, judicial construction has included both
.monopoly" and "a tendency to monopolize" within the ambit of its pro-
scriptions." The Valentine Act also is similar to the Sherman Act be-
cause both acts specifically proscribe acts which restrain trade33 and con-
tracts designed to effect a restraint.34
Ohio L. Abs. 231 (Ct. App. 1934), however, the Valentine Act was said to be patterned after
the Sherman Act and the interpretation placed upon it by the federal judiciary.
21. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01.
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01(B). OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01(A) defines "person"
to include corporations, partnerships, and associations, foreign and domestic.
23. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01(B) (1).
24. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01(B) (2).
25. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01 (B) (3).
26. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01(B) (4).
27. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01(B) (5).
28. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.04.
29. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.06. But see Orth v. Lauther, 95 Ohio App. 394, 120 N.E.2d
313 (1953).
30. For a comparison between the provisions of the Valentine and Sherman Acts and their
judicial interpretations see, Note, A Survey of Ohio Trade Regulation - A Comparison With
Federal Trade Regulation - A Recommendation, 25 U. CINC. L. REV. 476 (1956).
31. 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
32. State ex rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio
CP. 1947); Needles v. Bishop & Babcock Co., 14 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 445 (C.P. 1904).
33. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01 (B).
34. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.06.
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Exceptions
The broad mandate of the Valentine Act has been somewhat qualified
by exceptions, both legislative and judicial. In the Ohio Fair Trade
Law, " the legislature expressly exempted certain vertical price-fixing and
resale price maintenance agreements from the prohibitions imposed by the
antitrust statute. Other arrangements violating the literal terms of the
Valentine Act are permitted by the courts if they are "reasonable." 6
Similarly, the "rule of reason" governs the application of federal anti-
trust laws by federal courts.3" Also exempt from the Sherman Act, as
from the Valentine Act, are certain qualified resale price maintenance
agreements. The federal McGuire Act"8 makes such agreements legal
under federal antitrust statutes if a resale price maintenance agreement
is legal in the state where the product is sold.
There are still other exceptions to the federal antitrust laws, only
some of which have companion exceptions in Ohio. Agricultural co-
operatives, some expressly regulated industries, and organized labor are
exempted from proscription by federal antitrust law." These are not all,4"
at least to the same degree, made exempt from the proscriptions of the
Valentine Act.41 Nor does Ohio have a general price discrimination pro-
vision or a general "sales below cost" provision. Ohio legislation in these
areas is limited to a special provision in the Valentine Act relating to
price discrimination in dairy products42 and a statute forbidding the sale
of cigarettes below cost.4 Regulations concerning the issuing of trading
35. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1333.05-.10, .27-.34. To comply with the Ohio Fair Trade Act, the
commodity, label, or container must bear the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or
owner. It also is stipulated that the commodity must be in fair and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced by others.
36. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926).
The syllabus in this case states: "Contracts in restraint of trade are not illegal except when
unreasonable in character."
37. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
38. 66 Star. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (1958).
39. 38 Star. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 5 17 (1958); 62 Star. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9)
(1958).
40. The Agricultural Cooperatives Law, OHIO REV. CODE § 1729.01-.28, provides that an
association complying with its provisions is not a combination in restraint of trade. Further-
more, marketing contracts between the association and its members are not unlawful re-
straints of trade.
41. It was held in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), that the NLRB was
the proper body to decide questions of unfair labor practice, and that in certain cases involving
interstate commerce, it has exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, much of the labor field would seem
exempt from the operation of state antitrust laws.
42. OHio REv. CODE § 1331.15.
43. Omo REv. CODE §§ 1333.11-.211.
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stamps44 complete the list of Ohio's major inroads upon the scope of its
monopolies law.
Penalties
The Valentine Act differs from federal antitrust laws in its provision
for a civil recovery. Moreover, its criminal penalties are almost unique
among antitrust laws.
Civil Damages
In a civil suit under the Valentine Act, an award of two-fold dam-
ages and cost of suit may inure to plaintiff.4" Were the suit brought un-
der the Sherman Act, the possible extent of recovery would be treble dam-
ages and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.4" Thus,
in borderline cases, if a choice between the two acts is possible, the Sher-
man Act may appear the more desirable vehicle for a civil action.47
Criminal Penalties
In contrast, the criminal penalty attaching to a violation of the Valen-
tine Act is potentially far more severe than that under the federal act.
The Sherman Act provides a single criminal penalty consisting of a fine
not to exceed $50,000, or imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both.4"
Somewhat more complicated, the Valentine Act contains several crim-
inal penalties. The general provision49 consists of a maximum fine of
$5,000, and/or imprisonment from six months to one year for each of-
fense."0 Each day's violation is made a separate offense. This provision
could lead to shockingly large fines and prison terms."1
Apart from this blanket provision, those who violate the prohibition
against combinations to control the price of food may be awarded a maxi-
mum five year prison sentence and/or a fine for each day's violation.
The act provides that the minimum fine for this kind of violation shall
44. OHio REV. CODE § 1333.01-.04.
45. OHIo REv. CODE § 1331.08. See Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F.
Supp. 82 (N.D. Ohio 1960), which interprets this section.
46. 38 Star. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
47. There have been suggestions, however, that the treble damage provision of the Sherman
Act is a curse rather than a blessing to one bringing suit under it because it is too strong for
a jury to evoke, thus making proof of damages difficult.
48. 69 Star. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958).
49. It is not applied to a violation of the prohibition on combinations which purchase dairy
products at higher prices in one locality than in another. OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.15. Here,
a different penalty attaches.
50. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1331.04, .99(A).
51. It is possible that each day OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.02 (prohibiting monopolies and
restraints of trade by the use of a trustee or trust certificates) is violated, may not constitute
a separate offense. Although included in the general provision of § 1331.04, it is treated sep-
arately in § 1331.99 (A).
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be $500, but provides no maximum.5" Still another section of the Val-
entine Act provides that an additional fifty dollar fine may be assessed
for each day a violation of any of its provisions continues after due notice
is given by the state."
The section of the Valentine Act which prohibits combinations from
restraining trade by purchasing dairy products at higher prices in one
locality than in another is exempted from the above penalty provisions.
However, those who violate this section are subject to a fine not to ex-
ceed $500 or imprisonment not to exceed six months.'
As the act interestingly provides that its sections are cumulative of
each other and all other laws in any manner affecting them,55 it embodies
a formidable array of penalties. The cutting edge of the Valentine Act
would seem to be sharp enough to cow any potential violator of its pro-
visions, if there were any threat of its being used.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE VALENTINE ACT
In construing the Valentine Act, Ohio courts often have demon-
strated a tendency to follow the federal judiciary's construction of the
federal antitrust statutes. A reason for this may be found in a similarity
of background and legislative intent, if not of provisions. Both the Val-
entine Act and the Sherman Act were erected upon a foundation pro-
vided by the common law, and, to an extent, both are declaratory of it.5
On several occasions this has encouraged Ohio courts, frustrated in their
search for authority by the paucity of reported decisions under the Valen-
tine Act, to seek guidance in the application of the act from decisions
under the Sherman Act."T Thus, not long after the thrust of the federal
law had been judicially modified by grafting onto it a proviso that its pro-
visions applied only to "unreasonable" combinations, 5 much the same
qualification was appended to the Ohio act.59
52. Osno REV. CODE §§ 1331.05, .99(B).
53. OHIo REv. CODE § 1331.99(C).
54. Omo REv. CODE § 1331.03.
55. OHIo REV. CODE § 1331.14. Again, however, § 1331.15 is not included.
56. A federal court once indicated: "Speaking generally, the policies of the state of Ohio,
and of the United States, regarding restrictions of competition, are the same .... The rule
is that of the common law, declared for Ohio by the Valentine Act, and for the United States
by the Sherman Act." United States Tel. Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 202 Fed. 66, 70 (6th
Cir. 1913), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 620 (1913). See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911); State ex rel. Monnet v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 570, 65 NE. 464
(1900); Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880).
57. See List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471
(1926); Kissenger v. Columbus Macadam Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 135, (C.P. 1900).
58. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). An interesting discussion of this development can be
found in Handler, The Judical Architects of the Rule of Reason, 10 A.B.A. ANTnTRusT S c-
TION REP. 21 (1957).
59. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926).
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This modification causes the antitrust law, despite its literal terms, to
operate against only those transactions and combinations which in their
effect upon trade or competition and in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances are unreasonable because inimical to the public welfare.6"
Combinations which unite in a few the power to affect prices and thereby
suppress competition, or to deprive persons unfairly of the right to engage
in an occupation or business are deemed harmful to the public."'
Federal courts more recently adopted a doctrine of per se illegality
whereby certain activities by reason of their nature are conclusively pre-
sumed unreasonable restraints of trade.62 Some states have rejected this
doctrine as applied to their own antitrust laws," and its status still is un-
certain in Ohio.64 However, the doctrine finds support in some Ohio deci-
sions, 5 notably in the area of price fixing.
Although sometimes similarly construed, federal and Ohio antitrust
laws differ markedly in the frequency of their construction. There have
been sufficient cases brought under the federal statutes to lend them a
fairly substantial judicial gloss.66 Conversely, the Ohio experience has
been one of few cases in the period closely following the Valentine Act's
enactment and, more recently, the evaporation of even this meager sup-
ply. This experience, or lack thereof, has had an unfortunate effect upon
the quality of construction of the Ohio act and doubtless a corresponding
effect upon its utilization.
60. Ibid.; H. Lipman & Sons v. Brotherhood of Painters, 63 Ohio App. 157, 25 N.E.2d 22
(1939). A concise statement of the "rule of reason" as applied by federal courts is found
in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
61. Stark County Milk Producers' Ass'n v. Tabeling, 139 Ohio St. 159, 194 N.E. 16 (1934);
Clover Meadow Creamery v. National Dairy Prods. Co., 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 243 (1932),
rev'd on other grounds, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (Ct. App. 1934). In Stark County Milk Pro-
ducers' Ass'n v. Tabeling, supra at 173, 194 N.E. at 22, the court said: "The test for deter-
mining whether a covenant in restraint of trade is reasonable or not is to consider whether
the restraint is no greater than is sufficient to afford a fair protection to the interests of the
party for whose benefit it is made and at the same time not so large as to interfere with the
interests of the public."
62. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
63. See von Kalinowski & Hanson, The California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison With the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 533, 541 (1959).
64. See State ex rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d 104
(Ohio C.P. 1947), for an example of a case which utilizes this doctrine.
65. See Rayess v. Lane Drug Co., 138 Ohio St. 401, 35 N.E.2d 447 (1941); State ex rel.
Monnet v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 570, 56 N.E. 464 (1900); Central Ohio Salt
Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880). The latter two cases were decided under the com-
mon law, yet they strongly indicate that certain restraints are conclusively presumed contrary
to the public welfare. It is also worthy of note that at least one researcher has found in
the wording of the Valentine Act itself support for the position that certain restraints on trade
are illegal per se. See Note, A Survey of Ohio Trade Regulation - A Comparison With
Federal Trade Regulation - A Recommendation, 25 U. CINc. L. REV. 476, 480-81 (1956).
66. For a summary of guides for interpreting the federal antitrust laws, see ATr'Y GEN.
NAT'L COMM. ANTITRusT REP. (1955).
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APPLICATION OF THE VALENTINE ACT TO SPECIFIC PRACTICES
The purpose of this section is to illuminate the Valentine Act against
-a background of specific restraints of trade. It is hoped that by so doing,
-ihe Valentine Act will be made to seem more realistic and less an obscure
subject suitable merely for academic speculation.
At the outset, it should be remembered that under the provisions of
-the Valentine Act a contract or combination, if illegal, will be so due to
its ultimate purpose or to the method by which it seeks to accomplish
-that purpose. In the case of some offenses, price fixing is one, it seems
-there need be no demonstration of specific injury to individuals or the
public when an illegal purpose is evident. 7 These are offenses considered
unreasonable per se. In the other cases, as remarked earlier,"8 the restraint
must be shown to be unreasonable before the condemnation of the act
-can be evoked.
Restraint of Trade by Corporate Manipulation
Trusts
As generally applied to an unfair trade practice, a "trust" is an ar-
rangement whereby competing concerns combine to destroy competition
by placing their businesses under the control of a trust or trustee and re-
-ceive certificates as evidence of their interest. As defined in the Valen-
-tine Act, however, the term "trust" embraces many other proscribed
-combinations in restraint of trade. Yet the traditional trust is not over-
looked, as the act expressly provides that it is unlawful to place the
management or control of a combination or its manufactured product in
the hands of a trustee with the intent to fix the price or limit the pro-
duction of an article or commodity." This section of the Valentine Act
appears to declare what had earlier been held the common law of Ohio.
In State ex rel. Watson v. Standard Oil Co.7 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that an attempt by officers of an Ohio corporation to exchange
-the corporation's stock for certificates of the Standard Oil Trust was un-
lawful and would be enjoined as an ultra vires act by the corporation.
Mergers
Although the Ohio General Corporation Law gives corporations
broad authority to form or acquire shares of other corporations,7 the
67. See Rayess v. Lane Drug Co., 138 Ohio St. 401, 35 N.E.2d 447 (1941); State ex rel.
Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
68. See cases cited at note 60 supra.
69. OHIo REv. CODE § 1331.02.
70. 44 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892). There seem to be no reported decisions enforc-
ing the statutory proscription of the "trust" as a trade restraint.
71. OHno REv. CODE § 1701.13(F) (3).
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right does not extend to the creation of unlawful restrictions of trade or
commerce." Nor is it lawful to form subsidiaries for the purpose of
creating a monopoly or trade restriction." In applying these concepts,
however, Ohio courts have recognized that any merger or combination
of business interests will have the effect of decreasing competition to
some extent in the field involved. The courts have indicated, therefore,
that a deleterious effect upon competition brought about by the purchase
of one corporation's stock by another may not render the purchase void
if the effect is merely incidental to a transaction with a lawful purpose.7"
Monopolizing
The Valentine Act contains no provision equivalent to section 2
of the Sherman Act75 which under some circumstances prohibits
monopolizing by a single firm. The offense of monopolizing proscribed
by the Sherman Act is considered to consist of the possession of an
economic monopoly (monopoly power) within the relevant market
coupled with intent to secure or maintain it.76 Monopoly power itself
can be defined as the power to control market prices or to exclude com-
petition to a substantial degree.7
As noted earlier, the Valentine Act has been interpreted as proscribing
both monopolies and a tendency to monopolize. The cases containing
this interpretation, however, involved combinations by several enter-
prises for the purpose of an illegal restraint of trade. Thus, no Ohio
authority exists on the question of whether its antitrust law forbids a
single enterprise to gain for itself power to control a market.78
Price-Fixing
Agreements Between Competitors
Price-fixing by competitors has long been considered illegal in Ohio.
When engaged in by a substantial portion of the industry concerned,
72. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hocking Valley Ry., 12 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 49, 62,
a!f'd on rehearing, 12 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 145 (Cir. Ct. 1909). A suit may be instituted
against a corporation by the state Attorney General or the Prosecuting Attorney of the proper
county in quo warranto to restrain or enjoin violation of the Valentine Act. OHIO REV. CODE
§ 1331.11. If found guilty, the corporation may be dissolved, and a forfeiture of all its rights
to the state may be declared.
73. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hocking Valley Ry., supra note 72.
74. See Fechterer v. Palm Bros. & Co., 133 Fed. 462 (6th Cir. 1904); Kissenger v. Colum-
bus Macadam Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 135 (C.P. 1900).
75. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
76. See United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
77. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
78. But see Daily Monument Co. v. Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 144 Ohio App. 143, 176
N.E.2d 268 (1961).
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price-fixing was held illegal under the common law of Ohio. 9 In de-
daring the common law, the Valentine Act explicitly proscribed com-
binations and contracts which have as their purpose price-fixing"
Thus, in Ohio, contracts between producers, wholesalers, or retailers,
establishing agreed sale or resale prices on merchandise, are unlawful
and void.81 It seems, however, that under the Valentine Act a price-
fixing agreement is illegal regardless of the proportion of the industry
involved or the reasonableness of the price fixed. In taking this posi-
tion, one Ohio court adhered to the federal doctrine of per se illegality
of price-fixing agreements.83 The doctrine seems to be supported by
the language of the Ohio act, although enacted prior to development of
the doctrine by federal courts.84
A price-fixing association cannot escape the force of the Valentine
Act by adopting a unique or seemingly innocent form of organization.
The act forbids associations of any description of manufacturers, dealers,
or employers which have as their purpose price-fixing and the preven-
tion of" competition among members.8 Should such an association
come into being, any resolution or by-law designed to further its illegal
purpose would be void and unenforceable in Ohio.88
Agreements Between Manufacturers and Wholesalers or Retailers
Unless exempted by statute,"7 contracts stipulating that articles of
commerce provided to a retailer or wholesaler are to be resold only at
specified prices are ilegal under the Valentine Act. While the case of
McCall v. O'Neil,"8 which supports this proposition, was decided prior to
the enactment of the Ohio Fair Trade Law, it indicates the status of
79. McBirney & Johnston White Lead Co. v. Consolidated Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint
762 (Super. Ct. 1883).
80. OtIo REV. CODE § 1331.01 (B) (5).
81. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926);
Clover Meadow Creamery v. National Dairy Prods. Co., 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 243 (C.P. 1932),
rev'd on other grounds, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (Ct. App. 1934).
82. See Oliver v. All-State Freight, Inc., 156 N.E.2d 176 (Ohio C.P. 1956), aff'd, 156
N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); State ex
rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
83. State ex rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, supra note 82.
84. See Note, A Survey of Ohio Trade Regulation - A Comparison With Federal Trade
Regulation - A Recommendation, 25 U. CINc. L. REV. 476, 480 (1956).
85. State ex rel. Taylor v. Ross, 40 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377 (C.P. 1906); Needles v. Bishop
& Babcock Co., 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 77 (C.P. 1904); Runck v. Cloud, 8 Ohio N.P. 436
(Super. Ct. 1901); Kissenger v. Columbus Macadam Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 135, (C.P. 1900).
86. Graf v. Master Horse-Shoers' Protective Ass'n, 1 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 423 (Super. Ct
1904).
87. Certain vertical price-fixing agreements are exempt from antitrust law under the Ohio
Fair Trade Act, OHmo REv. CODE §§ 1333.05-.10, .27-.34.
88. 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 17 (C.P. 1914); accord, Freeman v. Miller, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
26 (C.P. 1909).
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resale price maintenance agreements which fall outside the protection of
that act.
A Common Selling Agency Used by Competitors
There is nothing in the Valentine Act which indicates that a number
of competitors of a product may not designate a single agency to handle
sales. Where a seller uses a number of methods of distributing his
product, the fact that he also uses a selling agent which a competitor
uses will not ordinarily raise antitrust problems. If, however, the com-
petitors agree that all their sales will be made through a common selling
agent, a problem may arise. This is particularly true when the agent
has authority to determine sales prices of the products. As price compe-
tition could thereby be eliminated, such an arrangement might be con-
sidered equivalent to price-fixing.
There are no Ohio decisions on this question, but some decisions
in other states hold such arrangements illegal under their antitrust
laws.89 On the other hand, a federal decision held that a proposed plan
for a common selling agent was legal in the absence of proof of an in-
tent or power to fix prices." It seems probable that were the arrange-
ment to result in price-fixing, it would be illegal under the Valentine
Act.
Limitation of Production by Competitors
The Valentine Act provides that a combination of two or more
persons to pool, combine, or unite any interests connected with the
sale or transportation of an article or commodity to affect its price is
unlawful and void."' Even prior to enactment of this statute, Ohio
courts refused to enforce contracts between normally competing pro-
ducers or dealers by which the parties agreed to refrain from compe-
tition and divide their respective profits in fixed proportions among
themselves." Similarly, contracts whereby manufacturers of a product
agreed to a production limit for each member and on the price to be
charged for the product were unenforceable under the common law.93
Such contracts are proscribed by the Valentine Act. It has been decided
89. See California Raisin Growers' Ass'n v. Abbott, 160 Cal. 601, 117 Pac. 767 (1911)
(dictum).
90. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
91. OHIo REV. CODE § 1331.01 (B) (5).
92. See Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 320, 24 N.E. 660 (1890); Hoffman v.
Brooks, 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1215 (Super. Ct. 1884).
93. McBirney & Johnston White Lead Co. v. Consolidated Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint
762 (Super. Ct. 1883).
[Vol. 15:179
Valentine Act
that these agreements are in no sense reasonable and thus dearly are
unlawful. 4
Exclusive Dealing and Tying Contracts
An exclusive dealing contract commonly is one by which a purchaser
is required to purchase all his needs from the seller, thus preventing the
purchaser from dealing with competitors of the seller. In cases where the
federal antitrust statutes apply to such contracts, they are governed by
section 3 of the Clayton Act. This section prohibits contracts where
their effect may be to "substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly." 5
As the Clayton Act is an addition to common-law antitrust prin-
ciples," it appears to provide no authority for interpretation of the Valen-
tine Act. However, since the Valentine Act has been held to proscribe
"a tendency to monopolize,"" under certain circumstances it would seem
to make exclusive dealing contracts unlawful. Yet in Federal Sanitation
Co. v. Frankel,"8 an Ohio court of appeals indicated that a contract of
exclusive selling rights which provided that the salesman could not en-
gage in the business for one year after termination of his employment was
not in restraint of trade when its terms were not oppressive and the
restraint was only partial.
Tying contracts, whereby the seller of one product requires the buyer
as a condition to the sale to purchase another product, are governed both
by section 3 of the Clayton Act and by the Sherman Act.9 Federal
courts hold such agreements illegal if the seller has "sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free com-
petition in the market for the tied product ... .""' There are no Ohio
decisions on the legality of such agreements under the Valentine Act.
Territorial Restraints on the Seller
Federal courts have held that arrangements whereby a seller agrees
to sell only to the buyer in a specified territory are illegal under the
Sherman Act when the arrangement is part of a plan to give a person a
94. See State ex rel. Monnet v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 520, 56 N.E. 464
(1900); State v. Crystal Ice Co., 5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 149 (C.P. 1906). But cf. Stark County
Milk Producers' Ass'n v. Tabeling, 129 Ohio St. 159, 194 N.E. 16 (1934).
95. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
96. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
97. State ex rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio
C.P. 1947); Needles v. Bishop & Babcock Co. 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 77 (C.P. 1904).
98. 34 Ohio App. 331 (1929).
99. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International Business
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451 (1922).
100. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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monopoly in the area involved and the parties have substantial market
control of the product.'' There appear to be no Ohio decisions on the
legality of such agreements. It would seem, however, that as the Ohio
antitrust law proscribes all agreements directed to monopolizing or
restraining trade, exclusive territorial arrangements would be illegal
under the Valentine Act if unreasonable.
Group Boycotts and the Picketing of Competitors
A combination by two or more persons for the purpose of boycotting
the business or trade of a third party would seem to be a combination
to carry out a restriction of trade or commerce and therefore a violation
of the Valentine Act. Certainly, under the Sherman Act federal courts
have held agreements by groups of competitors not to deal with a third
person unreasonable restraints of trade. 2 In Ohio, however, whether a
boycott is lawful or unlawful seems to depend upon its nature -
whether it is a primary or secondary boycott.' Absent the employment
of unlawful means, a primary boycott for a purpose considered legitimate
is not actionable, while secondary boycotts are unlawful and may be
enjoined.0 4
Although it might seem to be a course which falls under the proscrip-
tions of the Valentine Act, it appears that in special circumstances busi-
nessmen may picket their competitors. It has been held by an Ohio
court that where a genuine economic dispute exists, and there is no
resort to force or intimidation, an association of businessmen has the
right to picket the premises of a competitor who cuts prices established
under the National Industrial Recovery Act.' It seems best to limit this
decision to its special facts, as it appears that the Valentine Act may not
have been brought to the court's attention in this case.
THE FAILURE OF THE VALENTINE ACT
Despite its apparent wide applicability and extensive remedial and
punitive provisions, the Valentine Act is ignored - a sword left to rust.
Attempts to discover a single cause of the act's disuse prove fruitless.
It is not clear whether the failure is due to particular provisions, fac-
tors external to the act, or its very nature.
101. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 29 (1955).
102. Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
103. W. E. Anderson & Sons Co. v. Local Union No. 311, 156 Ohio St. 541, 104 N.E.2d
22 (1952). This holding, however, may not apply to agreements not to sell.
104. Ibid.
105. Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' & Dyers' Ass'n, 31 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 433 (C.P. 1934).
In this case, an NRA code of fair competition, ratified by the state General Assembly in the
adoption of the Ohio Recovery Act, was said to be an expression of public policy as to the
fair price to be charged.
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Factors Contributing to the Failure to Utilize the Valentine Act
Federal enactments loom large in the antitrust field, and it is diffi-
cult, if ever wise, to escape their shadow. The power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce reaches deeply into areas once considered
exclusively intrastate in nature. Moreover, as the nation's economy has
developed, businesses have tended to become more national and less
local in scope. Thus, they enter interstate commerce and its accompany-
ing federal regulation. Companion to these developments has been an
increase in litigation under federal antitrust laws.
That the increased importance of federal law has had a deleterious
effect upon utilization of state antitrust laws is hardly open to ques-
tion.' However, since the area of commercial activity within the legiti-
mate scope of state control is still considerable,"0 7 there is no demand that
states desert the field.
Yet it would seem that in Ohio the field has been abandoned to
the federal government. The Valentine Act provides that either the
state's Attorney General or the County Prosecutor of any county may
initiate enforcement proceedings under it. Never very great, activity
by these officials in prosecuting suits under the act now seems to have
ceased entirely. Only a few years ago, the state's Attorney General's
office seemed blissfully unaware that it had any responsibility to enforce
the provisions of the Valentine Act.' Yet in the same period, officials
responsible for enforcement of antitrust laws in the federal government
and in other states have actively continued in the field. 9 Although in
106. "Preemption of the field by the federal government looms as the most obvious reason
for the long want of state participation in antitrust enforcement." Note, The Present Revival
and Future Course of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.UL. REV. 575, 578 (1963).
107. In 1959, the New York Attorney General indicated that under its recently amended
antitrust laws, the state had commenced or recently concluded actions involving the following
industries: milk production; dry-cleaning; hard surface floor covering, food distribution; ap-
parel; hardware distribution; and phases of building maintenance. Lefkowitz, New York State
Antitrust Activity - Another Year of Progress, 31 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 110 (1959).
108. During the course of its reply to the Special Committee to Study the New York Anti-
trust Laws, the office of the Attorney General of Ohio stated: '"The Prosecuting Attorneys
of the eighty-eight counties in Ohio constitute the enforcement agencies for this chapter on
monopolies just as they constitute the enforcement agencies for all criminal laws of Ohio."
N.Y.S.B.A., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMrL-rEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANT usT
LAWS 107a (1957). Yet in addition to his responsibility under OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.11,
a responsibility shared with the several county prosecuting attorneys, it appears that the At-
torney General is the only official who can bring a proceeding in quo warranto to oust a
foreign corporation violating the Valentine Act from the state. OHIo REv. CODE § 1331.07.
109. In the period 1940-48, the Department of Justice instituted over 900 antitrust suits,
and a survey indicated that since 1949 an average of 200 suits yearly have been filed by
private parties. von Kalinowski & Hanson, The California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison
With the Federal Antitrust Laws, 6 U.C.LA.L. REV. 533, 534 (1959). State activity re-
cently has been on the increase, perhaps sparked by New York's leadership in amending its anti-
trust law in 1957. See Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEXAs L. REv.
753 (1961); Note, The Present Revival and Future Coarse of State Antitrust Enforcement,
38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 575 (1963).
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the past the Attorney General's office has taken a rosier view,"' it seems
most unlikely that there have been no offenses whatsoever under the
Valentine Act in the last several years.
It must be noted that a significant number of suits brought under
the Sherman Act result from efforts of the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department. The diligence of this staff adds much to the force
of the federal statutes. A like result has been apparent where a state
maintains a staff whose only duty is to enforce its antitrust laws."'
There never has been provision for a similar body in Ohio.
The absence of a substantial amount of litigation under the Valen-
tine Act in the past may have had a self-perpetuating effect. For the
law has been left unsettled to an extent, with a resulting discouraging
effect on those contemplating a suit or defense based on the act's pro-
visions. Even a cursory look at the footnotes of this note will disclose
that the few decisions existing under the Valentine Act are for the most
part products of lower courts.
It also appears that if indeed there is an area where both federal and
Ohio antitrust statutes apply, the federal law commonly has been the
vehicle chosen. Reasons for this may be found in the unsettled state
of Ohio authority under its antitrust law, in what might be considered
procedural advantages of federal courts," 2 and in the Sherman Act's
provision for treble damages. 13
THE FUTURE
While its past is distinguished only by its disuse, the Valentine Act
could have a brighter future. It was, in 1889, an expression of a then
popular fear of the power of monopolies and other combinations in
restraint of trade to injure the public. As we have become more ac-
customed to massive and many-tentacled commercial enterprises, this
fear has lessened; but the danger remains.
110. Again quoting the reply to the New York Special Committee by the office of the At-
torney General of Ohio: "[TIrust monopolies have not been a problem in this State ...."
N.Y.S.B.A. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEw YORK ANTiTRusr
LAWS 107a (1957).
111. California, New York, and Wisconsin all have special antitrust staffs, and, unsurpris-
ingly, these states lead in antitrust enforcement.
112. The federal statutes contain provisions for bringing in additional parties and for dis-
covery which are more liberal than those of Ohio. FED. R. CIV. P. 22-24, 26-37. It may be
noted, however, that the Valentine Act is like the Sherman Act in providing immunity from
prosecution to witnesses required to testify in either criminal or civil suits under the act.
OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.13. The corresponding section of the federal law is 32 Star. 904
(1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1958).
113. See Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforce-
ment, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954). A somewhat less enthusiastic view is expressed in Clark,
The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 Msci.C
L. REV. 363 (1954).
[Vol. 15:179
